


The Seven Days and Atlanta: Similarities and Differences

John B. Gilmer Jr.

These two campaigns, in 1862 and 1864 respectively, have striking similarities. In both cases new and suspect commanders directed an aggressive series of counterattacks consisting mostly of frontal assaults after the failure of maneuver plans, and lost more heavily than did the Union. Both had problems with slow or uncooperative subordinates. Both were attempting to defend a vital city. In each case, the South had a cavalry advantage. There were differences too: Sherman was not McClellan, Hood was not Lee, and both armies had learned to intrench by 1864. Yet, the performances were not that different. Ironically, it was the success of Hood's attack at Gaines' Mill that allowed the Seven Days' campaign to be counted a Confederate success, and put Lee on the road to glory.

A brief summary of the Seven Days campaign, June 26 to July 1, 1862:

Date	Battle	Action, losses:
June 1	Fair Oaks/Seven Pines	Smith, Longstreet, DH Hill uncoordinated attack 3rd, 4th corps(+) Conf losses: 6134 of 41816 Union losses: 5031 of 44944
June 26	Mechanicsville	AP Hill (+) vs 5th Corps, frontal attack across difficult terrain Conf losses: 1484 of 16356 Union Losses: 361 of 16808
June 27	Gaine's Mill	Longstreet, AP Hill, DH Hill, Whiting divisions vs Union 5th Corps plus reinforcements, frontal attack across difficult terrain Conf losses: 8751 of 57018 Union losses: 6836 of 36790
June 29	Savage Station	Magruder vs 2nd Corps (+), frontal attack
June 30	Frayser's Farm	AP Hill, Longstreet vs 3rd Corps + McCall (5th), Sedgewick (2nd), Meeting engagement, Confederates attacking
July 1	Malvern Hill	DHHill, Huger, Magruder vs 5th corps with artillery, rest of army, frontal attack against an excellent defensive position for June 29- July 1 losses: Conf. Losses: 17377 of 88113 Union losses: 8036 of 98032
Seven Days Campaign totals:		Conf losses: 27612 of 98348 Union losses: 15233 of 105229



Principal Battles of the Seven Days:

1. Mechanicsburg
2. Gaines' Mill
3. Frayser's Farm (Glendale)
4. Malvern Hill

All were attacks by Lee on parts of McClellan's Army, first above the Chickahominy, the below in an attempt to cut McClellan's path of retreat.

The Seven Days' Campaign, 1862


Lee attempted to attack the Union flank, first the Union right flank North of the Chickahominy, then the Left at Frayser's Farm, which had a chance to cut McClellan's army off from its retreat route. In none of these actions did all of the various subordinates commit their forces to the battle in a timely manner. Only Gaines' Mill can really be considered a Confederate victory, in that the Union forces were forced from the field by the result of the battle. In other cases, the Union forces withdrew as a result of threats from other forces (real or imagined). The final battle was born in Lee's frustration. It was a frontal attack with no reasonable chance of success other than a hope that demoralized Union troops would flee. Fair Oaks, about a month earlier, could be thought of as the beginning of the series of battles around Richmond, but it is not part of the Seven Days campaign proper, and precedes Lee's taking command. There were other minor actions not included in the list of battles above. (Strengths and Losses from Livermore)

A brief summary of the Atlanta campaign, July 20 to July 28, 1864:

Date	Battle	Action, losses:
July 20	Peachtree Creek	Stewart and Hardee's corps attack 20th corps (+), frontal attack Conf. losses: c2500 of 20000 Union losses: c1900 of 21000
July 22	Atlanta	Hardee flank, Cheatham frontal attack on Army of the Tennessee Conf. losses: c5500 of c40000 Union losses: 3722 of 34863
July 28	Ezra Church	Lee's corps (+) frontal attack on Army of the Tennessee Conf. losses: c3000 of c15000 Union losses: 632 of 13542
Atlanta 20-28 Campaign totals:		Conf. losses: c14800 of c55000 Union losses: c6000 of c81000

Aug 31-Sept 1 Jonesboro

Hardee & Lee frontal attack on 15th Corps, followed by an attack by the Army of the Tennessee on Hardee's corps alone the next day
Conf. losses: c3000 of 25600 Union losses: 1453 of 22166



Principal Battles of the Atlanta (city) Campaign:

1. Peachtree Creek
2. Atlanta
3. Ezra Church
4. Jonesboro

All were attacks made by Hood's arm on a part of the Union force. The Army of the Tennessee (M for McPherson) with Schoefield (Ohio) and Army of the Cumberland (T for Thomas) were the two main Union forces.

The Battles for Atlanta, 1864

As Sherman advanced on Atlanta, Hood attacked his right just after it crossed Peachtree Creek. This failed, and was followed by a retreat and flank march to begin the attack on Sherman's left. An attempt to meet Sherman's maneuver to the West of Atlanta resulted in the battle at Ezra Church, which was a frontal attack managed by S.D. Lee, though Hood had apparently not intended that the battle be fought, at least on that date. In the first two actions, the attacks were long delayed due to subordinates not reaching expected positions in the times expected. Even so, the July 22 battle began with an effective flank attack, though by chance the Union 16th Corps happened to be in a position to frustrate the plan. Although properly part of the Atlanta campaign, Jonesboro is more than a month later, and for purposes of comparison won't be considered, just as we set aside Seven Pines earlier. As with the Richmond defense, there are other less important actions not listed. (Losses and strengths from Livermore, except Confederate losses from Castel. Confederate losses from this period are estimates, and earlier ones are considered to be too high for the Confederates.)

One constant in both cases concerns the earlier campaigns that led to these battles. In both cases, General Joseph E. Johnston had been maneuvered back to the outskirts of a vital Confederate city by McClellan and Sherman respectively. At Richmond he was wounded in the course of the Battle of Fair Oaks against a fragment of the Union army that had recently crossed the Chickahominy River. Before Atlanta, he was relieved due to President Davis's fears that he would not fight for that city, but would be maneuvered out of it as he had from successive

positions over the previous two months. This time, his replacement as commanding general came just prior to a battle similar in plan to Fair Oaks. But the battle would be fought by Hood.

In both campaigns the Confederate commander, Lee and Hood respectively, had recently assumed command of his army. Lee had about a month, from Johnston's wounding at Fair Oaks, during which McClellan effectively surrendered the initiative. Hood had only two days, though he did have the advantage of having served in the army up to that time. Neither Lee and Hood were popular choices. Lee had waged an unsuccessful campaign in West Virginia and was serving as an advisor to Jefferson Davis. He had seniority, so that issue was not a problem. In contrast, Hood was junior to most of the other senior generals in the Army of Tennessee, and his relief of Johnston was viewed unfavorably by many, and particularly by Hardee, perhaps his most important subordinate. Furthermore, there were other senior command changes just prior to both campaigns. In each case, the command structure was unsettled. As for the opponents, McClellan was conducting his first campaign with the Army of the Potomac, but had been in charge since well before the start of the campaign. Sherman was conducting his first major campaign as an independent army commander, and he too had begun the campaign in that position. Neither had lost or made changes in their senior subordinates.

Neither Confederate general was content to remain on the defensive. Both series of battles feature several attacks, generally frontal, on a portion of the Union force which was, overall, superior. Lee had an advantage that McClellan's army was essentially static at the beginning. Hood was trying to hit a target that was constantly moving. The ratio of Lee's force to the Union army facing him was closer than for Hood. The only battles that were not frontal attacks were Frayser's Farm (somewhat more of a meeting engagement) and the Battle of Atlanta, which at least began with a deep move around the Federal flank. Both, tactically, assumed the character of a Confederate attack. Despite the attackers' intentions to attack only a small part of the Union force, the strength ratio of troops actually engaged seldom showed any superiority. For Lee, at Gaine's Mill, there were enough Confederates to gain a costly victory that set McClellan on the path of retreat. But, it was a very close battle that might easily have ended in defeat. At Atlanta on July 22, Hood managed to have a tactical superiority of numbers engaged, but at a much closer ratio. It was not enough to win the battle.

Why were these attacks so often frontal, and futile? They were not planned that way. When A.P. Hill attacked Porter's 5th Corps at Mechanicsville, Jackson was expected to attack on the flank. But he didn't. The Seven Days saw a succession of similar problems as Lee tried to maneuver to advantage, only to have one commander or another show less energy and initiative than expected. These balky subordinates included particularly Stonewall Jackson, who was late on four occasions, as well as Magruder and Huger. Similarly, Hood's battles at Atlanta showed slow execution and lack of coordination. In both cases the maneuver being attempted, as envisioned by both Lee and Hood, was perhaps beyond the ability of their troops, subordinate commanders, and command structures.

Much is made of the fact that Hood did not command in person at the front where critical events were unfolding. He was not present in person at Peachtree Creek or Ezra Church. On the 22nd, he was in the city with Cheatham, but it was the critical flank move where things went awry. Hood's mobility was limited by his wounds. The same issue has been raised concerning

Spring Hill much later. But Lee did not conduct the Seven Days from the front either. An army commander simply cannot always be in the right place, especially when large scale maneuver is being attempted. If the commander is away from headquarters with a part of his force, he is that much further removed from the rest of it.

The cost of these frontal attacks can be read in the numbers above. Lee lost about 10,000 more men than did McClellan, from a smaller army. Hood lost similarly. Yet, Lee's campaign is regarded as a success, Hood's as failure. The difference may lie more in the character of their opponents, as well as the fact that Lee in fact had one genuine victory among his series of expensive attacks. McClellan chose retreat. This was partially due to his belief that Lee had the superior numbers. Sherman did not; he had fairly accurate intelligence on relative strengths. However, his progress was checked for a period. It was not until September 1 that he managed to get astride Hood's communications at Jonesboro, forcing the abandonment of Atlanta. In contrast, he had gone from Chattanooga to the Chatahoochie in a similar period while Johnston was in command.

One other point of similarity is worth noting, though it goes beyond this campaign. Malvern Hill was perhaps Lee's worst moment. It came immediately after Lee experienced the frustration of failing to trap McClellan's army at Frayser's Farm, due to lack of vigor on the part of his subordinates. He was angry as well. He then launched the Battle of Malvern Hill, an attack with insufficient reconnaissance into massed artillery, in which his army lost heavily while accomplishing little. The comparison to Spring Hill and Franklin is striking. Hood, pursuing Schoefield toward Nashville, came very close to success, but was frustrated by what he saw as lack of energy on the part of subordinates. The terrible frontal assault at Franklin immediately followed, with Hood's frustration the obvious reason for the catastrophic choice of tactics. Lee's loss at Malvern Hill, which resulted in greater losses, is less notable in degree of catastrophe only due to failure of subordinates (notably Huger) to carry out even a frontal assault with the vigor expected, the fact that space did not permit him to employ his whole army, and the larger size of the army. Lee's subsequent accomplishments eclipsed this disaster. Pickett's Charge is better known. Consideration of Hood will always remember Franklin.

So, why should we care, even if there are many similarities between these campaigns? As those interested in Military history, and the potential to reexamine these moments in war games, the issue of leadership and ability ratings perhaps excites the keenest interest. In campaign games treating the whole war, Lee generally has the best rating. Hood (as an army leader) isn't at the bottom, thanks to the likes of Butler, but he's not far away. Four examples are:

	Lee	Hood	McClellan	Sherman
<i>The Civil War</i> , Victory Games: (initiative (low is better), tactical combat, army commander combat (reroll options))	2,3,2	2,-1,2	3,-1,0	2,2,2
<i>The War for the Union</i> , Clash of Arms (command rating = span of control, combat rating, * is aggressiveness bonus, movement, number of subordinate corps commanders allowed)	4,2*,9,4	2,0,7,1	4,0,7,3	4,1*,9,2
<i>Grand Army of the Republic</i> , Task Force (attack, defense ratings, number of strength points influenced, maximum span of control)	2,3,5,18	1,0,2,12	0,1,3,14	2,1,3,14
<i>American Civil War</i> , SPI	1,+3	1,-1	1,-2	1,+2

(Initiative, combat ratings)

difference in army combat values:	Lee vs McClellan	Hood vs Sherman
<i>The Civil War</i> , Victory Games: (difference in "reroll options")	+4	-3
<i>The War for the Union</i> , Clash of Arms (combat modifier difference; Lee is *. Lee also gets +1 corps. Hood is -1 corps and -2sp's)	+2 (+*)	-1 (-*)
<i>Grand Army of the Republic</i> , Task Force (Attack and Defense are different. In this large zone game, Sherman is the attacker.)	+1a,+3d	0a,-2d
<i>American Civil War</i> , SPI (difference in combat ratings)	+5	-3

I have argued that the results in both campaigns were not that different. In fact, Lee had the advantage of a more favorable ratio of forces, and a longer time in command before his first battle. Yet, in game terms, the numbers assigned to these individuals are remarkably different, as are their general reputations. This has much to do with what happened later. Hood had the misfortune to assume command as the Confederacy's fortunes were fading. Lee assumed command when both the Confederacy's resources were higher and the less capable enemy commanders had not yet been relegated to other duties. While I would certainly not argue that Hood was Lee's equal, this is evident more in later events than in the course of these two campaigns.

There is another issue. We have gotten used to the idea that a significant sized city, especially one defended by fortifications, gives the defender an advantage. This is pervasive in the rules of virtually all war games. Yet here, the Confederacy defended both of these cities, and did so at a much greater cost to themselves than to the Union, which in a strategic sense was the attacker. Are there counterexamples, where the defender did get the expected advantage? New Orleans fell to the Navy. Nashville fell without a fight in 1862, as did Memphis, as a result of distant maneuver.

Vicksburg might be considered as a strategic and fortified city. In contrast to the campaigns for Atlanta and Richmond, at Vicksburg Pemberton did not employ an aggressive defense. Indeed, his response was rather passive. Grant did the attacking, losing 2441 at Champion Hill and 3199 in the assault on Vicksburg itself out of an army of about 33,000 and 45,000 respectively. Pemberton lost 3851 of about 20,000 at Champion Hill, more heavily than Grant, and probably rather lightly in Grant's later assault, but at the end of the siege surrendered about 30,000. (Livermore does not list losses for Big Black River, and other minor engagements of the campaign.) This one example of a less aggressive defense was decidedly unsuccessful.


No other major city except Richmond itself, in 1864-1865, was the object of such a contest between major armies. If cities are to give a defensive advantage, a game system also needs to convey the negatives such as the tactical restrictions of having to defend it, and the political pressure to force the enemy away from it. Johnston, in 1864, was unwilling to acknowledge these negatives, and so lost the confidence of his commander in chief, and his command.

This raises an interesting issue: How does the contest for Richmond in 1864 differ from these other two campaigns? It was a successful defense, and not at a cost as dear (relative to the Union losses) as Richmond in 1862 or Atlanta 1864. An examination of that campaign reveals a similarity of tactics. Lee held fortifications, but also used part of his army to strike at the enemy as he maneuvered on the flanks. Unlike 1862, Lee was no more successful at driving Grant away from Richmond and Petersburg than Hood was driving Sherman away from Atlanta. A series of battles was fought below Petersburg (Weldon RR in August, Poplar Spring Church in September-Oct, and Boydton Plank Road in October) in which A.P. Hill delivered attacks with some success, checking but not rolling back the lengthening siege lines. Also unlike the earlier cases, Grant made a number of costly assaults, as did Lee, which were more frontal in character. A key difference is this: Lee had been in command for two years, and A.P. Hill as well as Ewell and many other subordinates had been with him all of that time.

A brief summary of the Petersburg/Richmond campaign, June 15 to Oct 28, 1864:

Date	Battle	Action, losses:
June 15-18	Petersburg	2nd, 5th, 9th, and 18th corps attack beauregard and reinforcements from Lee in Petersburg, frontal attack against formidable position Conf. losses: c2970 of c4100 Union losses: c8150 of 60635
July 30	The Mine	9th corps (+) attacks after mine blast in Johnson's div sector, Sanders and Mahone restore position; frontal attack on defenses. Conf. losses: c1500? of c12000 Union losses: 3798 of 21981
Aug 14-19	Deep Bottom	2nd and 10th corps attack North of James River Conf. losses: ?? of c20,000 Union losses: 2901 of 30080
Aug 18-21	Weldon RR	A.P. Hill counterattacks 5th, 9th corps extending around flank Conf. losses: c1620 of c16000 Union losses: 4455 of c30300
Sept 29,30	Chaffin's Farm+	10th, 18th corps attack N of James river Conf. losses: c1700 of cc12000 Union losses: 3327 of c22000
Sept 30-Oct 2	Poplar Spr. Church	5th, 9th corps try to reach Southside RR, counterattack by AP Hill Conf losses 1310 of c27000 defending Petersburg, Union losses 2950 of c62000 facing Petersburg, of which c24000 attacked.
Oct 27,28	Boydton Plank Rd.	A.P. Hill, Cav counterattack extension by 2nd, 5th, 9th Corps Conf losses: ?? of c22000 Union losses: 1758 of c45000

Campaign totals for above: Conf losses: c13000 of c60000 Union losses: c27300 of c90000
(Losses from Livermore where available, except Sept 29-Oct 2 from Sommers, and some other strengths and losses from Esposito.)



Principle Battles at Petersburg, 1864

1. Petersburg
2. The Mine
3. Deep Bottom
4. Weldon RR
5. Chaffin's Farm
6. Poplar Springs Church
7. Boydton Plank Road

4, 6, and 7 featured attacks by A.P. Hill.


Battles for Petersburg, 1864

So, ultimately, perhaps we can learn one important lesson from this comparison: There is no substitute for a good working relationship among the commanders of an army. In sports, one hears references to "team chemistry" that can ruin a team that has superior individual players, or can make special a team of less talented ones. The same phenomenon is on exhibit here. With his command situation in June of 1862, Lee was not much better than Hood would be in 1864. He would show later, with trustworthy subordinates Jackson and Longstreet, that he was much, much better. Interestingly enough, one of Lee's most noteworthy failures was at Gettysburg, when he had just reorganized his army's structure command. Perhaps this command stability issue is even a dominant effect, eclipsing the issues of individual talent.

In that light, perhaps one of Hood's more important accomplishments was the death of McPherson. Hooker of Chancellorsville fame was a corps commander. With Howard, who he blamed for that defeat, now elevated to command the Army of the Tennessee, Sherman also lost the angry Hooker as a Corps commander. Then a squabble between Palmer and Schoefield frustrated Sherman's attack at Utoy Creek. Sherman, too, had command problems. Bragg's difficulties at Chikamauga, with several hastily assembled corps, also becomes more understandable. The Confederate command under similar circumstances at Shiloh was likewise a muddle. Pope's situation at Second Manassas also follows this model.

Our wargames do not do a good job of representing this. Perhaps we need to consider a system of modifications that reflect this. A negative marker might be placed on an army or other unit when command changes, or upon assembly of new major commands into the army. The marker would go away (or be reduced) with the passage of time, or perhaps after a battle. Perhaps there would also be randomly determined departures from the army due to bad relationships when a commander changes.

Another interesting issue in war games is how to represent these battles, in which the side having the strategic initiative (Union) is the defender in the tactical sense. In games having large zones, such as *Grand Army of the Republic*, it is clear that the Union force must be (in a game sense) the attacker. This game was chosen as a representative to illustrate this point.




Grand Army of the Republic: The Peninsula Campaign

In this particular game, the Seven Days campaign is lumped in with Yorktown, Williamsburg and the rest of the peninsula campaign: McClellan is the attacker, and loses about 7SP's while inflicting about 5SP's, and then presumably chooses to retreat. If the Southern force is credited with Longstreet or Lee, the Union losses are higher. The historical campaign saw heavier Confederate losses than Union, yet it was the Union army that retreated. The historical result cannot occur in the game, since a larger Union army inflicting higher proportionate losses than it takes has no reason to retreat and everything to gain by maintaining the attack. (The Union does not have a supply problem here. I assumed results of "battle cards" would be a net wash.) Note that Lee, and the reinforcements that came after he took command, simply do not enter the picture. Possibly you could assume Johnston retreated out of the zone, and Lee counterattacked back into it. Note that the game uses "Corps" to designate organizations that are typically smaller than the historic corps, but often not as large as armies; the numbering is arbitrary.

In the same game, the Atlanta campaign consists of Sherman advancing into the Atlanta area against J. Johnston. Average losses in one round of combat are 7 SP each, after which the Confederates obviously retreat (to the Decatur zone, preparing to advance on Nashville). If you credit the Confederates with being entrenched (at least Johnston's troops, perhaps not Polk's) the Confederate losses are a bit lower. This is not a bad approximation of the overall campaign

results. The resolution necessary to represent the tactics of defending Atlanta, and of the difference between Johnston's and Hood's phases in the defense, is beyond the scope of this game.



Grand Army of the Republic: The Atlanta Campaign

Victory's *Civil War* and Clash of Arms's *The War for the Union* use hexagons of about 25 miles per hex (slightly smaller for the latter). All of the fighting for both campaigns could be considered as taking place within one hex, though separated in time into separate "battles."


We consider Victory's *Civil War* first. If we accept that the armies maneuver in monolithic wholes, then our representation of the Seven Days consists of Lee attacking McClellan, who is adjacent to Richmond. (We include the historic reality of Huger's presence, though no sane Confederate player would have failed to exile Huger by this time, however. At the very least he should have been left in Norfolk with 1SP. With this game's mechanics, in this situation he is much more of a liability than Jackson and Longstreet together are a credit.) With a +12 to the die roll (too much to be useful), the Confederates inflict at most "d2" (demoralized and -2 Strength Points, or SP's), and with 4 re-roll options should manage to get that result. The Union force (with +4 including Huger but not Meade) inflicts d3 losses on the Confederates. (There is no chance of other results.) If we model the campaign as two consecutive Confederate attacks, this could happen twice, with results that are close to historical in terms of losses, but without having forced the Union withdrawal. Of course, no Confederate player in the game would make such an attack.



The Civil War: The Seven Days

One feature of this game is the use of abstract "Action Points" that are used to "activate" generals. Action points are limited. It takes only 2 to activate Lee, Hood, or Sherman, but 3 for McClellan and most other generals. The same number of action points is needed to remove demoralization. Thus, it is very possible for Lee, Hood, or Sherman to attack, undemoralize, then attack again, perhaps repeatedly, in one two month long turn. It also is possible for this to happen before the opponent gets to do anything. The system has the negative that the player, representing the national command (President) is put in the role of prioritizing between actions in different theaters that should in many cases be simultaneous and autonomous. It also makes more than two player gaming more difficult.

Looking on Atlanta similarly we find Sherman, who as a 4 star general can carry multiple armies, advancing on Atlanta. Considering Atlanta's defenses to be "Intrenchments" (rather than a fortress), and assuming that Sherman has managed to cross the Chatahoochie (as shown) before the battle (no -1 column shift), then the Union army inflicts d2 or d3, while the Confederates inflict d2 to d3, in both case with a 50% chance for each. With the Union getting 3 reroll options, the result is probably d2 Union and d3 for Confederates. This would force the Confederate army out of Atlanta. If we assume bad Union luck requiring two attacks (with a recovery from demoralization in between) then the second attack might raise casualties to historic levels. If we assume Atlanta is a fortress, the extra column shift very slightly affects the Confederate losses, and allows them to avoid retreat until attacked a second time. If they are still demoralized when Sherman attacks again, the retreat is forced. This might be the most accurate representation of the series of battles around Atlanta from a losses perspective, but you notice that we have had to assume that it is Sherman who is attacking, not Hood, and maneuver is not much of a factor.



The Civil War: The Atlanta battles

In *The War for the Union*, there is not quite as much motivation for armies to maneuver as monolithic wholes, since an attack can include forces in other hexes (although at 1/2 strength) and all leaders can move at the same time, prior to combat, not just a single one. The army commander's benefit can count for (his) corps commanders not in the same hex. In contrast, combat in Victory's "Civil War" occurs as a consequence of movement by a force under the command of a single leader. This is a powerful motivation against making detachments.

McClellan's army in *The War for the Union* is shown all in one hex, attacked by Lee from Richmond, as for *The Civil War*. Lee has 2 chances in six to force McClellan to retreat (but in both cases takes no more losses than McClellan does) and one chance to be forced to retreat and thus abandon Richmond (or be forced to retreat into a fort, if there is one). Lee's casualties will probably be the same as McClellan's (3 to 4 SP's), with one chance of being 1SP lighter. If Lee succeeds in forcing McClellan to retreat, he can attack again and take more losses. This is a reasonable interpretation of what happened. As with *The Civil War*, Confederate losses are probably lighter than the historical result, although there is at least a chance to displace McClellan.

<p>Arm of Northern Virginia: Lee (as Army cdr:+2, commands 4 corps) Lee 0 1SP Jackson +2 6SP Longstreet +1 6SP Magruder +0 4SP Stuart (cav)+1 1SP</p> <p>average: 18SP at +1 plus the +2 for Lee (But game limit is +2)</p> <p>+Veteran troops: +1</p>		<p>Army of the Potomac: McClellan (as Army cdr: +0, commands 3 corps) McClellan 0 4SP Franklin 0 4SP Sumner 0 4SP Heintzelman 0 4SP Porter * 0 5SP</p> <p>average: 21SP at +0 +0 for volunteer troops +1 for terrain (woods)</p> <p>*: McClellan's span of control omits Porter, but defending it doesn't matter.</p>
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The War for the Union: The Seven Days

In this game it makes sense under some circumstances for the army to split up and attack from multiple hexes. In this case, for example, Jackson could move to and attack from the hex just North of McClellan, and still receive the benefit of being under Lee (since he is adjacent). He would be x 3/4 in strength for the minor river. Likewise, another lieutenant might be in Petersburg (but halved for the navigable James river). Some such diversion of strength can be afforded without being bumped down a column on the Combat Results Table. Historically, everything happened in one hex. A case could be made that McClellan actually entered the Richmond hex, but that would, in the game's rules, require that Johnston have retreated into Richmond fortifications to endure seige. But McClellan never established a seige in the sense of what the term means in the game rules. In any event, Lee is too strong to be besieged. Thus, the simple attack as shown here most closely represents the historic event. (Note that the minor river shown is the York and its tributaries, not the Chickahomony that actually divided McClellan's force.)

Sherman and Hood around Atlanta would again be all within one hex, that containing Atlanta, except for the final move to Jonesboro. While Atlanta might be considered to have a Fort, Hood does not retreat inside (to endure seige and eventual surrender), so the representation of the battles must be an attack by Sherman on Hood, who is in the Atlanta hex. Sherman has a 50% chance of forcing Hood to retreat, and 2 of 6 chances of incurring lighter casualties (both of which involve Hood's losing Atlanta). There is no possibility of Hood losing more heavily but holding on to Atlanta, as actually happened, except for the unhistoric possibility of his choosing retreat into the city and enduring seige in the sense of Vicksburg).

Army of the Tennessee:
 Sherman
 (as Army cdr: +1,
 commands 3 corps)
 McPherson +1 6SP
 Logan 0 2SP
 Army of the Cumberland
 (Thomas, +0 3 corps)
 Hooker 0 4SP
 Howard 0 4SP
 Stoneman(cav) 0 2SP

average: 18SP at +0
 plus the +1 for Sherman
 +Veteran troops: +1

(note: avoids the river)



Arm of Tennessee: Hood
 (as Army cdr:+0,
 commands 1 corps)
 Hood 0 2SP
 Hardee 0 6SP
 Cheatham* 0 2SP
 Wheeler(cav)*+1 2SP

average: 12SP at +0
 +Veteran troops: +1
 Fortifications: +1

* Hood's span of control
 omits Cheatham and
 Wheeler, but defending it
 doesn't matter.


War for the Union: The Atlanta Battles

Just as in the Seven Days situation, Sherman could leave some troops on the North side of the Chatahoochie, but then they would be attacking at 3/4 strength due to the river. This would drop Sherman a column on the Combat Results table, and he wouldn't want that. Historically, all of the fighting, and maneuvering, was on the South side. The stream involved was Peachtree Creek, which is too insignificant for this scale. Indeed, eventually almost all of Sherman's force passed between Atlanta and the Chatahoochie before Hood abandoned the city after Jonesboro.

An interesting difference between these two games is the selection of leaders. *The Civil War* only particularly interesting leaders are included, including division commanders with unusual abilities such as Jackson, Sherman, Sigel, and Huger. Porter, Heintzelman, McCook, and the mass of other Union Corps level leaders are omitted. In contrast, *The War for the Union* omits division commanders and includes almost all corps commanders. As a result, in *The Civil War* some leaders like Sigel and Huger are there only to be a nuisance almost no possibility of being of any real value. In *The War for the Union* even the less capable leaders can typically serve a useful purpose.

In both *The Civil War* and *The War for the Union*, we could consider taking some liberties with the sense of scale, to assume that the maneuvers take place not just in one hex but also in some of the others surrounding the city of concern. The Union player could divide his force to maneuver towards the city's supply lines while protecting his own communications with a smaller (but presumably entrenched) portion of his force. Likewise, the defending army might sally out with only a proportion of its force in order to counterattack from a hex that makes reaching the city's rear more difficult, while holding the city with the remainder. This has more the character of how these campaigns played out. However, it requires some exaggeration of scale, and is discouraged by the rules, especially by the Action Point and Reaction rules of *The Civil War*.

In *The Civil War*, the only logical division of McClellan's army before Richmond is extension of a portion into the hex directly North of Richmond. In that hex it is protected by river hex sides. In fact, Porter's 5th corps did attack a Confederate detachment that would be in this hex, but did not stay there. With some exaggeration, we could treat this hex as being the Union army North of the Chickahominy. Since this game does not have a Porter, we use Hooker instead, the only Union leader marker other than McClellan at the scene who can lead 6 SP's. Lee would then leave Magruder and Huger with 5 SP's entrenched in the Richmond hex and attack with Jackson, Longstreet, D.H. Hill, A.P. Hill, and Stuart. With 13 sp's against about 6, and a leadership bonus of +11 (vs +1 for Hooker) and 3 rerolls, this is a wipeout: The Union detachment of 6SP's loses 3SP's, is forced to retreat, and demoralizes the rest of the Union army assuming it retreats Southeast. The Confederates may lose nothing, and have only a small chance of being demoralized. That is, this is the outcome unless McClellan makes his reaction roll (1/2 chance) and sends help.



Alternative Seven Days Campaign in *The Civil War*; Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill

Let's assume McClellan does react, with a small force (equivalent to Sedgewick reacting with a few SP's to prevent 2-1 odds, as happened at Gaine's Mill). Now Lee still wins, but the casualty ratio is somewhat less favorable, and there is a somewhat greater chance of demoralization. If McClellan reacts instead with most of his army, let's say 10 sp's. Then Lee's attack is at -3 (with a further -1 column shift (to 1 to 2) for terrain) and it will be guaranteed that both are demoralized and the Confederates may lose more heavily, d3 vs d2 for the Union. In that case there are still 5 SP's (possibly entrenched, in woods, hopefully with a decent leader, we assume Hancock) guarding McClellan's communications to the James. (Actually this is a problem, in that Hancock at this point can move only 2SP's, not the 6 allowed for a two star general. He still benefits defense without problem, and if Lee actually attacks this force, there won't be but 2 SP's left afterwards anyway.)

Let's assume Lee gets the action points (it only takes 2) to recover from demoralization after an unsuccessful attack on most of McClellan's army North of Richmond. He will still be in the Richmond hex, having retreated there. He can now leave Jackson, A.P. Hill and D.H. Hill and 4SP's (if we want to follow history) facing McClellan in Richmond and attack the smaller force (we can imagine this is at Frayser's Farm and Malvern Hill) with Longstreet, Magruder, and Huger and maybe 10SP's, enough to give a 2 to 1 ratio. (If Lee had been in another hex, the rules

do not allow him to pick up Magruder and Huger and the 5SP's in Richmond on his way through.) McClellan gets a reaction chance (1/3 if he's still demoralized, otherwise 1/2) to react and gets there with help. Historically, you would say he made this roll, and as a result Lee attacked a superior force (all of McClellan's army), which won. Lee's attack is 1 to 2 into woods (but not entrenchments) and is guaranteed a d3 result, while the Union army will likely be demoralized, and may suffer as much as d2. Note that McClellan does not retreat. And indeed, Harrison's Landing where he camped after Malvern Hill can be thought of as being in that hex. It is reasonable to leave him there. The campaign result, assuming McClellan made his reaction rolls, is 6 SP's lost (30,000 troops) for the Confederates, and about 4 SP's for the Union. Pretty close to history.

Army of Northern Virginia:	
Lee	☆☆☆ (2 rerolls)
Longstreet	☆ +2
Magruder	☆ +1
D.H. Hill	☆ +1
Huger	☆ -2
10 SP's	
(The other leaders stay in Richmond)	

Army of the Potomac:	
McClellan	☆☆☆
(-1 rerolls)	
Hooker	☆☆ +1
Sedgwick	☆ +0
14 SP's	
McClellan=3 reaction:	
has 1/2 chance (1/3 if demoralized) to react and move to join Hancock and defend.	

Alternative Seven Days Campaign in *The Civil War*; Frayser's Farm and Malvern Hill


The above narrative is not too bad at explaining the campaign. There is just one major flaw: A reasonably experienced Union player is not going to divide his force as described. The game does not motivate it. Indeed, the inability of a detached non-army force to react to, and escape from a moving army, and the very unfavorable losses it would incur even if it survives, made such detachments foolish. Improved reaction rules, allowing a smaller force a chance to escape, and limiting the combat results table to the smaller size of the two forces involved, would go some ways toward making this more realistic type of campaign more likely. A further problem is that an army assembled in the same hex can be moved in its entirety using just the leader's command (action) points. But if any units are in a separate hex, they cost additional action points to move equivalent to (or more than) the army's. This means that they tend to be left behind and unavailable, so detachments tend to be left only in strong defensive positions. Allowing the army (when moving) to include forces in adjacent hexes might help, perhaps at one extra action point each.

Furthermore, the Confederate player in this example is forced to make poor use of leaders in order to stay true to the historical sequence. As mentioned earlier, Huger has no business being here; he is much worse than useless. Furthermore, in the second phase the Confederates leave many good leaders out. Maybe this even makes sense; they only marginally would increase the chances of greater Union losses, and stand a risk of being killed. But this is not a reasonable mechanic.

The combat system proper of this game has some deficiencies that affect the outcomes: Minor (1 star) leaders having a large effect on army combat, loss levels (Small, medium, or Large) set by force size rather than by either the smaller (or larger) of the two sides, and negative leadership adding to own losses rather than subtracting from the enemy's.

In conclusion, it is possible to engineer the historical campaign, but only by using moves that a Confederate player would not use, and with McClellan making all of his reaction rolls. The result looks like a Union victory: McClellan is never forced to retreat.


In the same game, an Atlanta campaign could unfold with Sherman leaving Thomas directly in front of Atlanta (but to the Northeast to be on the South side of the river). The Union will have left a few SP's directly North of Atlanta to block a move by Hood against the Union communications. Historically cavalry (although not Stoneman) did this job. At the game's scale, it is impossible for Thomas to both be directly North of Atlanta, as he actually was, but also South of the Chatahoochie. Sherman with McPherson swings South and East to land on the railroad. The representation we could have of the Battle of Peachtree Creek requires that Hood attacks Thomas from Atlanta while leaving Wheeler (and Cheatham) to guard against McPherson to the East. This would perhaps put 8 SP's attacking 9, with Hardee (+1) and Cleburne (+2) involved. (Most of Thomas's army and Cleburne did not get into the battle, but they were present as it started.) This gives Hood +4 but -3 rerolls. The most likely result is a "demoralized" and -1 or -2 SP result for both. There is some chance for Hood to win. If Sherman is present in the hex with Thomas instead of McPherson, Confederate chances are much slimmer, and they will probably lose d2 to the Union army's 1 or d1. Note that we are assuming that the Army of the Tennessee does not react. Sherman would have a 2/3 chance of making such a reaction roll. If he does, Hood's attack is very definitely against the odds, has no chance of success, and probably loses d3 to 1 or d1 for the Union. Historically, this did not happen. Sherman felt that Thomas was strong enough that he could withstand any attack that might be made against him; he was more worried about McPherson's army. He also knew that he could not get there in time, contrary to what the game allows.

<p>Army of Tennessee: Hood ☆☆☆ (-1 rerolls) Hardee ☆☆ +1 Cleburne ☆ +2 8 SP's</p> <p>Also in Atlanta: (Cheatham) 3 SP's</p> <p>Wheeler ☆ +2 (after retreat before combat vs Sherman and the Army of the Tennessee)</p>		<p>Sherman ☆☆☆☆ (+2 re-rolls) Army of the Tennessee: McPherson ☆☆☆ +1 Schoefield ☆☆ +1 Logan ☆ +1 8 SP's</p> <p>Army of the Cumberland: Thomas ☆☆☆ (+2 re-rolls) Hooker ☆☆☆ +0 Howard ☆☆ -1 9 SP's</p>
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Alternative look at the Atlanta Battles: Peachtree Creek, in *The Civil War*


Hood can, after recovering from demoralization, leave some troops entrenched in Atlanta and attack McPherson: The Battle of Atlanta. Hood, with +5 to the die roll and +1 strength

advantage to the Union's +3 and 3 rerolls has a reasonable chance of success. Both forces will be demoralized and lose at least one and probably 2 SP, but either side might win. Most likely is a draw that leaves the Union army in place. There is even a slight possibility that the Union losses will be 3SP. If Sherman is not with this wing of his force, the Union is +2 and 1 reroll, with a bit greater chance of a Confederate victory. There is a 1/2 chance for Thomas to react and also enter the battle. That would make Confederate defeat certain and decisive. Historically he didn't.



Alternative look at the Atlanta Battles: The Battle of Atlanta in *The Civil War*

If we go one step farther to the Battle of Ezra Church, we have Howard (now commanding the Army of the Tennessee after McPherson's death) swinging to the West of Atlanta, which in the game requires a much longer march than it did in reality. Hood sent S.D. Lee to block the way. Lee attacked, losing heavily while inflicting little loss. In the game, this is a very even fight, with about equal chances for either side to win. Average results are d1 to both. Note that we had to assume that Hood did not make his reaction roll (2/3 chance, or 1/2 if we assume he was demoralized). If he made the reaction roll, Howard would be the attacker, and would be crossing the Chatahoochie with a -1 column shift, a battle the Confederates will probably win. (It would be even worse for Howard if Hood reacted to move North.) Note that the cavalry is absent; Sherman has sent his southward and Wheeler gave chase.



Alternative look at the Atlanta Battles: Ezra Church in Victory's "The Civil War"

Like the maneuvers around Richmond, this sequence appears to offer some chance of replicating the Atlanta city battles reasonably, with Hood attacking Union detachments with real chances of success. As mentioned earlier, the game discourages this kind of division of monolithic armies. In this case, the fact that both the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Cumberland are present makes separate maneuvering more attractive for the Union. But if they are separated, only one gets Sherman's control benefit, and the action point cost to maneuver the whole force increases greatly. The Union is better off with a straightforward attack by the whole stack on Atlanta.

Notice that in the Seven Days sequence, we only achieved the historical result if McClellan made all of his reaction rolls (unlikely) and reacted with his whole army (historically quite inaccurate). Lee also conducted his battle much less cleverly than an actual Confederate player would. In contrast, the Atlanta series, requires only fairly reasonable assumptions to give historic results, and none of the maneuvers are completely unreasonable. Both sides do things that a typical player might not, but note that all of Hood's attacks have some chance of success. One can reasonably conclude that the leader ratings in the Atlanta case reflect the particular situation (including Hood's -1 for having just assumed command), while the leader ratings for the Confederates in the Seven Days example are too high, being based on performance later in the war.

It is possible to find similar maneuver options in the *The War for the Union* game. The fact that all leaders can move every turn means that maneuver of a force in separate hexes is more reasonable, and in fact occurs often in game play. Furthermore, the shorter turns and more limited movement means that wide maneuver can't happen quite as suddenly without the other player getting a turn in which to react. On the other hand, there is no reaction mechanism similar to that in Civil War, so that smaller forces are somewhat vulnerable to being swept up by aggregated armies, discouraging maneuver into separate hexes. In the interest of brevity, a detailed analysis of these cases similar to that for *The Civil War* will be omitted.

There are games that cover the entire war at a finer resolution, in which maneuvers as described above can reasonably be represented. These include SPI's "War Between the States" (with 1 week turns) and WWW's "Mr. Lincoln's War" (with 1 month turns). Both require considerable space and time to play, and hence perhaps are less likely to be played. Leader ratings in these games, as with the games addressed here, must cover the entire war, with no provision for leaders improving. So, for example, Lee in SPI's game starts out as a "4-5-3" (initiative, command span, and combat bonus) compared to "1-5-2" for McClellan, ?? for Hood, and ?? for Sherman. WWW has Lee as the sole "3" rated leader, with Sherman a "2" and McClellan and Hood as "1."

It is interesting to contrast the ratings given earlier with leader ratings in games which cover individual battles. In those games, the designer rates the leaders based on his perception of their ability at the time. One such series, the games of which all have the same rules and which treats leadership very explicitly, is The Gamers' "Brigade Combat Series" covering various Civil War battles. Let's take a look at Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet over the course of several battles:

	Lee	Jackson	Longstreet
Seven Pines	-	-	0
Gaines' Mill, Malvern Hill	3	0	4
Second Manassas	4	4	4
Antietam	4	4	4
Gettysburg	1	-	4
Wilderness	4	-	3

Here we see that Lee is rated better later (except Gettysburg) than earlier. If you consider Confederate command effectiveness to be the combination of these leaders, you see that in the Seven Days the low rating for Jackson also helps make Confederate command effectiveness significantly lower than it will be later. The game series has consistent rules but no obligation to have leaders retain the same values always, as is typical in theater games. (Sherman never appears in any series games as an army commander, and Hood appears once, with a 0 in Spring Hill and Franklin.)

(Actually, in *The Civil War* leaders do change, but only with promotions, rather than at the same rank. Knowing who will get better and who will get worse can skew how you handle your leaders, a problem for such a system.)

Command relationships are an intangible that is hard to quantify, and event harder to reduce to a game mechanic. Yet the similarity of these two campaigns, Lee at the Seven Days and Hood at Atlanta, and the similarity of results, argues that the command chemistry is such an important effect that we fail to capture an important reality if it is missing. Leader ratings for Lee and his lieutenants, based on performance in later battles, tend to overstate the Confederate leadership advantage at the Seven Days. In Hood's case, the ratings tend to stick him in the mode he was in upon just assuming command. The same may be true for some of the Union generals whose tenure was too brief to develop a coherent army high command, as well as Early in the Valley.

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There are many, many books which cover the events described here. A the few listed below were of particular use, especially in developing the numbers in the accounts of the various battles.

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